Publications

The case of Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India, AIR (2009) SC 84, addressed the legal complexities of cross-border surrogacy. Following the separation of a Japanese couple before the birth of Baby Manji through a surrogacy agreement with an Indian surrogate, the Supreme Court prioritized the child’s welfare, directing the issuance of travel documents for her to join her grandmother in Japan. The Court highlighted the lack of legal frameworks for surrogacy in India and emphasized the role of the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. This landmark judgment underscored the need for surrogacy regulation, ultimately influencing the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.

In OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. vs. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt. Ltd., 2024 INSC 711, the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute involved unpaid dues and counterclaims related to project delays and customs duties. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Enexio, ordering OPG and its holding company, Gita Power, to pay outstanding amounts. OPG’s challenge under Section 34 led to the award being set aside by a single judge of the High Court, but a division bench reinstated it. The Supreme Court upheld the award, emphasizing that courts should not interfere with awards that are reasoned and free from perversity. It clarified that when arbitral awards are intelligible and sufficiently reasoned, they should stand, and only awards with flawed, unintelligible, or inadequate reasons may be set aside. In this case, the Court found the award sufficiently reasoned, reinstating it and dismissing OPG’s counterclaims, thus affirming the limited scope of judicial review in arbitration matters.

In the case of National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., the Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition filed by the NCPCR under Article 32, emphasizing that statutory bodies created to protect fundamental rights cannot invoke Article 32 to enforce their mandates against state authorities or private entities. The NCPCR had taken suo motu cognizance of alleged child trafficking by an NGO in Jharkhand and, dissatisfied with the state’s response, sought reliefs including the creation of Special Investigation Teams (SITs) to investigate similar organizations nationwide. The Court held that Article 32 is primarily for individuals to enforce their fundamental rights, not for statutory bodies with dedicated powers under their enabling statutes. It criticized the petition’s vague and broad prayers, pointing out that the NCPCR should use its statutory powers to address child rights violations rather than seek constitutional remedies. This judgment reinforces the limited scope of Article 32 for statutory authorities and the necessity of relying on existing legal mandates.

In Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. vs M/S Sanman Rice Mills & Ors. [2024 INSC 742], the Supreme Court of India upheld an arbitral award and emphasized limited judicial intervention under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute concerned outstanding dues between the Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation (appellant) and M/s Sanman Rice Mills (respondent). While the arbitral award in favor of the appellant was upheld by the Additional District Judge under Section 34, it was later set aside by the High Court under Section 37. The Supreme Court, citing precedents such as MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. (2019) and Konkan Railway Corp. v. Chenab Bridge Project (2023), reinstated the award, stating that courts should not interfere with arbitral decisions based on alternative views of facts or contractual interpretation, thus preserving the integrity of the arbitral process.

In Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., 2024 INSC 757, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the rejection of the appellant’s bid for failing to submit a Power of Attorney, while allowing another bidder to rectify a similar deficiency and awarding the contract to them, was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) had issued a tender for coal extraction, and the appellant’s bid was rejected for non-compliance with a clause in the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT). However, another bidder with similar deficiencies was permitted to rectify its errors, leading to the contract being awarded to them. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court, which dismissed the plea, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. Citing Central Coalfields Limited vs. SLL-SML (2016) 8 SCC 622, the appellant argued that any deviations from essential terms of the NIT must apply uniformly to all bidders. The Court agreed, holding that the unequal treatment breached principles of fairness and equality, set aside the rejection of the appellant’s bid, and directed BCCL to initiate a fresh tender process to ensure transparency and fairness.

In Union of India v. Pranav Srinivasan (2024 INSC 792), the Supreme Court ruled that Pranav Srinivasan, a foreign national born in Singapore to Indian-origin parents, could not claim Indian citizenship under Article 8 of the Constitution or Section 8(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Pranav sought to resume his Indian citizenship based on his grandparents’ birth in India and his parents’ renunciation of Indian citizenship after acquiring Singaporean nationality. The Court held that Article 8 applies only to persons of Indian origin residing abroad at the time of the Constitution’s commencement, and Section 8(2) requires valid renunciation of citizenship, which was not met in Pranav’s case. It emphasized that Indian citizenship laws must be interpreted strictly, and such citizenship cannot be granted based on a liberal approach. However, the Court allowed Pranav to apply for citizenship under Section 5(1)(f) of the Act, which requires foreign nationals to fulfill specific residency conditions.

In Neeraj Sud & Anr. vs. Jaswinder Singh (Minor) & Anr. (2024 INSC 825), the Supreme Court clarified that mere deterioration of a patient’s condition after surgery does not automatically indicate medical negligence. To establish negligence, it must be proven that the doctor failed to exercise due care or lacked the necessary skill or qualifications for the procedure. Relying on the Jacob Mathews v. State of Punjab (2005) decision, the Court reaffirmed the Bolam Test, which protects doctors who act in accordance with accepted medical practices. It also rejected the application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in the absence of evidence showing failure to exercise due skill. The Court overturned the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission’s compensation award, emphasizing that the doctor had the requisite qualifications and followed proper medical protocols, thereby reinforcing the importance of expert medical opinion and adherence to accepted standards in medico-legal cases.

In Saroj & Ors. v. IFFCO-TOKIO General Insurance Co. & Ors. (2024 INSC 816), the Supreme Court clarified that the Aadhar card should only be treated as proof of identity and not as definitive proof of date of birth. This decision emerged in the context of determining compensation in a motor vehicle accident claim. Citing K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1, the Court emphasized that where there is a discrepancy in the date of birth between an Aadhar card and a School Leaving Certificate, the latter should be considered the authoritative source for establishing age. This ruling serves as a reminder of the Court’s dedication to fair and accurate standards, particularly in evaluating claims for compensation in accident cases. It reinforces the importance of using reliable documents for age determination, which can significantly affect the outcome of compensation claims.

In Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2024 INSC 763), the Bihar Technical Service Commission (BTSC) disqualified candidates with private university diplomas unapproved by the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) in its recruitment for Junior Engineers. This criterion was challenged based on Bharathidasan University v. AICTE (2001), which held that universities do not require AICTE approval for technical programs. The Patna High Court initially directed BTSC to complete the selection but allowed the State to cancel the process and restart recruitment with amended rules, a decision later appealed by the aggrieved candidates. In a pivotal decision, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s move to cancel the selection, citing K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008), where altering selection criteria post-selection was deemed unfair as it “changes the rules of the game after the game has been played.” The Court directed BTSC to create a fresh selection list, incorporating both the previously disqualified candidates and those initially selected, thus upholding the candidates’ rights against arbitrary rule changes.

In the case of Vidyasagar Prasad vs. UCO Bank & Anr. 2024 INSC 810, the Supreme Court upheld the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against a Corporate Debtor that defaulted on loan repayments to UCO Bank. The NCLT had approved the CIRP application, prompting the Corporate Debtor to appeal to the NCLAT. The Debtor argued that the absence of the financial creditor’s name in the balance sheet indicated a lack of acknowledgment of debt, which they claimed invalidated the extension of the limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, rendering the CIRP application time-barred.

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, asserting that the entries in the balance sheet, along with the auditor’s notes and a One-Time Settlement (OTS) proposal, constituted a clear acknowledgment of the debt owed to the bank. Citing precedents from Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal and Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd., the Court affirmed that a company’s balance sheet does not need to list every creditor by name to acknowledge debts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that other documentation can suffice to establish acknowledgment for extending limitation periods.

The appellant initially filed a return in November 1989 and revised it twice. The Income Tax Officer rejected the second revised return, declaring that it was barred by limitation u/s 139(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which only allows a revised return to be filed before the earlier of two dates – one year from the end of the relevant assessment year or before the completion of the assessment.

The appellant approached the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) where the appeal was dismissed on grounds that the revised return was time-barred. The matter was then placed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which partly allowed the appeal but remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer, instructing him to consider the claim. A further appeal was preferred by the IT department to the Madras High Court where the ITAT’s decision was set aside and it was held that once the revised return was barred by limitation, there was no legal provision to entertain the appellant’s claim. Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Finally the Apex Court upheld that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to consider the claim and as such the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had no authority to instruct the Assessing Officer to consider any claim made in case of a time-barred return. Relying on Goetzge (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2006) 204 CTR (SC)182 the court reiterated that the assessing officer cannot entertain any claim made by the assessee otherwise than by following the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Since there is no dispute that the revised return filed by the appellant was barred by limitation, the same could not be entertained.

In this Criminal Appeal, the Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings, quashing charges u/s 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code 1860 & S.13(2) r/with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and held that continuing the criminal trial would cause great oppression & prejudice, when the appellants had played no active role in the conspiracy and since the matter had already been financially settled.

The appellants were alleged to be involved in a conspiracy to fraudulently secure loans from Allahabad Bank through their firm, Clarion Travels, in collusion with several others. They had loans sanctioned without proper security, which they failed to repay and the bank incurred financial losses. In 2011, a One-Time Settlement was reached between the borrowers and the bank, and the loan was fully repaid, post which the Original Application filed before the DRT was disposed. The appellants, both women are wives of the principal accused who is now deceased approached the High Court and sought to quash the criminal proceedings, arguing that continuing the case after the settlement would be futile. The High Court rejected their plea directing them to submit their pleadings before the trial court.

The Court relied on precedents like – Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU (X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591, Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another (2008) 9 SCC 677, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 SCC 303 where financial disputes were resolved through settlement justifying the ending criminal of cases, considering the fact that the possibility of conviction was remote in matters arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership transactions or offences arising out of matrimony or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved the dispute.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding an SLP against an order of MP High Court dismissing the appellant’s revision application held that S.132 of The Evidence Act, 1872 does not provide absolute immunity to the witness making self-incriminating statements as the same could be abused by an influential person with the help of a dishonest Investigating Officer. The Court held that the only protection available to the witness U/S 132 is from prosecution based on his incriminating statement and not applicable to other evidence on record. Dinesh Goyal @ Pappu v. Suman Agarwal (Bindal) & Ors., 2024 INSC 726 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while adjudicating an SLP which assailed the judgment of the Hon’ble MP High Court in a Miscellaneous Petition held that delay occurred in preferring amendment application wouldn’t be relevant if the aspect introduced in the amendment is necessary to be decided to adjudicate the issues framed in a case. The respondent/plaintiff in the above case had questioned the genuineness of a ‘Will’ after a year of filing the suit by way of amendment of plaint U/O VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirming the High Court’s decision allowed the same as the partition of the suit property would not be possible without a determination of the question of the existence of the will and its genuineness.

2024 INSC 686 – Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Berger Paints India Ltd.: In this judgment, the Supreme Court of India addressed whether an application for extending the time period for passing an arbitral award under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, can be filed after the expiry of the stipulated period. The Court held that such an application is indeed maintainable even after the initial twelve-month period or the extended six-month period has lapsed. Previously, the Calcutta High Court had ruled that extensions must be sought before the arbitral tribunal’s mandate expired. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the power to extend time is vested in the court, which can be exercised for “sufficient cause.” This ruling underscores the need for flexibility in arbitration proceedings, highlighting that strict adherence to procedural timelines should not override the practical need for fair and effective dispute resolution. By permitting extensions post-expiry, the Court aims to balance the necessity for timely awards with the realities of arbitration, thereby aligning with the legislative intent to facilitate arbitration as an efficient and flexible process, free from overly rigid procedural constraints.

The case involves a service dispute between S.D. Manohara (appellant) and Konkan Railway Corporation Limited & Ors. (respondents). The core issue is whether the appellant withdrew his resignation before its acceptance by the employer. The appellant tendered his resignation on 05.12.2013, which was allegedly accepted by the respondent on 15.04.2014, effective from 07.04.2014. However, the appellant contended that he withdrew his resignation on 26.05.2014, before it was formally accepted. The Supreme Court found that the resignation was indeed withdrawn before its acceptance, as the letter dated 15.04.2014 was an internal communication and not served to the appellant.

The Court noted that the appellant continued to work and was in communication with the respondent, indicating no finality to the resignation. The Court allowed the appeal, directing the reinstatement of the appellant with 50% back pay for the period he was relieved from service. The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka was set aside.

In the case of Arvind Kejriwal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2024 INSC 687), the Supreme Court of India addressed the legality of Kejriwal’s arrest by the CBI and his subsequent request for bail. Kejriwal, a prominent political figure, was implicated in a case involving alleged irregularities in the framing and implementation of the Excise Policy for 2021-2022. The Supreme Court held that the CBI cannot justify the arrest and continued detention of an accused solely on the grounds that the accused is giving evasive replies during the investigation. The Court emphasized that an accused has the right to remain silent and cannot be compelled to make self-incriminating statements. This ruling underscores the importance of protecting the constitutional rights of the accused, particularly the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. It reinforces that the power to arrest must be exercised judiciously and not as a tool for coercion.

The Supreme Court addressed a dispute over the delayed possession of an apartment. The appellant sought a refund with interest due to the respondent’s failure to provide necessary completion and firefighting clearance certificates.

When the Respondent had pleaded the application to be barred by limitation on the ground that the date on which the possession of the property was granted was beyond 2 years as contemplated under Section24A. However, the Hon’ble Court had held that the ongoing interactions and part payments extended the limitation period, making the complaint timely. The court had considered the last date of payment of consideration to be the date on which the cause of action got ceased under Sections 18 and 19 of the Consumer protection Act.

Further, while deciding the validity of the possession that was in fact claimed to have gotten concluded from the perspective of the Builder, the Hon’ble supreme court had held a valid offer of possession requires completion and firefighting clearance certificates. Further, it was also held that in the absence of such certification, the offer to provide possession and consequential handing over possession would be rendered invalid.

The Court while holding the above principles, considering the relevant facts therein, had ordered a refund with 9% interest from the complaint date and additional compensation of Rs. 15 lakhs, emphasizing the importance of statutory compliance by developers.

In Criminal Appeal No. 2501 of 2024, the Supreme Court of India addressed whether an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), is maintainable when the accused is already in judicial custody for a different case. The appeal arose from a Bombay High Court judgment that permitted the respondent, already in custody for one case, to seek anticipatory bail in another.

The Court while dealing with the above Issue, clarified that anticipatory bail is a statutory right under Section 438 of the CrPC rather than a constitutional or fundamental right.

The key issue was whether a person already in custody for one offence could have a “reason to believe” they might be arrested for another offence. The Court affirmed this possibility, noting that the individual could be re-arrested either immediately upon release or through formal procedures while still in custody.

Emphasizing the importance of procedural fairness and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court rejected the argument that a subsequent arrest does not add to the individual’s humiliation. It underscored that each arrest contributes to the person’s distress and social stigma, thereby compounding the impact on their liberty.

The Supreme Court went on to assert that an accused can seek anticipatory bail for a different offence even while in custody for another. It found no statutory or procedural bar to such applications and emphasized that denying this right would contravene the principles of fairness and personal liberty. The appeal was therefore dismissed, with the Bombay High Court directed to decide the anticipatory bail application based on its merits.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while testing an impugned judgment in which the Hon’ble High Court had framed four substantial questions of law which were neither raised before the trial court nor opportunity was given to the parties to lead evidence for the same, and it was held that an appellate court cannot create a new case by framing additional issues and is obligated to decide the issues involved in the suit based on the pleadings of the parties. The court referred to Order XLI, R. 25 of CPC., that empowers the appellate court to frame issues and remand the same for trial to the court whose decree is appealed from, if necessary.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with an SLP set aside the judgment and remanded a matter back to the Division Bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court for parties to appear and argue afresh as the impugned judgment did not contain any reasoning and merely agreed with the judgment of the single judge which was under appeal.

The Court while referring to an earlier decision reiterated that reason is the very life of law, when the reason of law ceases, the law itself generally ceases and the process of correction of judgments in appeal should not only be implemented but seen to be implemented. Speaking orders or reasoned decision is considered one of the three principles of natural justice which demands that justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a Writ Petition in this landmark decision issued a slew of directions to make First Information Reports (FIRs) available to the accused and the public at large.

The Hon’ble Court directed that all police stations shall upload FIRs within 24 hours except in cases of sensitive nature involving sexual offences, insurgency, terrorism or of that category. Additionally, relaxation of the timeline up to 48 hours or a max of 72 hours was allowed for connectivity problems due to geographical location or if there is some other unavoidable difficulty

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a Public Interest Litigation has held that Chargesheets cannot be published on police or government websites for public viewing on par with FIRs as it may violate the rights of the accused, victim and investigation agencies. Additionally, it was held that the chargesheet / documents along with the chargesheet cannot be said to be public documents under Section 74 of the Evidence Act.

The petitioners therein have heavily relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India where, it had directed copies of FIRs to be published within 24 hours of their registration on the police websites or the websites of the State Governments. The Hon’ble supreme court had observed that the FIR and the Chargesheet cannot be considered on the same footing and that previously, the FIR Was ordered to be published to ensure that the Accused is not taken by surprise.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with an SLP arising out of disposal of Writ of Habeas Corpus has categorically held that the father of a child cannot be granted custody merely because he is a natural guardian but the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration and that its judicial conscience is shocked by the fact that the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court treated the child as a transferable movable property.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to criticise the non-consideration of the fact that the father is alleged to have committed the dowry death of the child’s mother and that the 2.5-year-old child had been living with her maternal aunt since two years. It is pertinent to mention that the Hon’ble supreme court had ordered a sleuth of directions in the best interest of the Girl Child and her future course of action.

That the proof of ‘demand of bribe’ by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing the offence of bribe taking, coming under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in a Departmental enquiry, the Decision/order by disciplinary authority, is required to give reasons only when it disagrees with finding of the enquiry officer and not when it concurs with that finding. Also, held that the mere quoting of what transpired would not amount to the giving of any reasons.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that It is the Duty of the Disciplinary Authority to record reasons. The orders of disciplinary authority and appellate authority entails civil consequences. Hence, the orders must be based on recorded reasons.

The Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that, mere recovery of the currency note and positive result of the phenolphthalein test not enough in the peculiar circumstances of the case, to establish guilt of the appellant on the basis of perfunctory nature of materials and prevaricating type of evidence. That the Charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

This case reinforces the principle that when the law prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence, courts do not have the authority to impose a lesser sentence unless explicitly provided by the statute. Interpretation of statutory provisions regarding minimum sentences and the discretion of the court in imposing such sentences. The Supreme Court clarified that a minimum sentence is a mandatory punishment prescribed by the legislature, which must be imposed without any judicial discretion. It is a fixed quantum of punishment that cannot be reduced by the court. When the legislature specifies a minimum sentence, courts are bound to impose it. This applies to both imprisonment and fines. Some statutes provide minimum sentences but also grant courts discretion to impose a lesser sentence. In such cases, the court can award a lower sentence or opt not to imprison the accused, provided reasons are recorded in writing. If the statute does not allow for the sentence to be reduced to nil, it mandates a minimum sentence. Conversely, if the court has the discretion to reduce the sentence to nil, the statute does not prescribe a minimum sentence in the strict sense. The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between statutory provisions that mandate a minimum sentence without discretion and those that allow judicial discretion in sentencing. This distinction has significant implications for interpreting and applying the law, particularly under the PO Act.

The Sentence Can Be Suspended under Section 389 CrPC, in Appeal Only If Convict Has Fair Chances of Acquittal. Also observations are made that the Appellate Court should not re-appreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.

The Evidence of Injured witness has greater evidentiary value, their statements can’t be discarded lightly. Also the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that, Suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.

It was held that, there is no need for identification parade where the witnesses already knew who the assailants were. Test identification parade is not a sine qua non in every case, that is, if the facts and circumstances of a case conclusively establish the guilt of the accused, then, there is no need to hold test identification parade.

Solitary witness – conviction is valid – Need not insist on corroboration by other witnesses – single witness if found to be trustworthy, it can be appreciated – Interested Witness – Explained.

The Court reaffirmed that the mere fact that a witness is related to the deceased should not be the sole reason for rejecting their testimony. Instead, the evidence should be assessed for its trustworthiness and credibility. If found reliable and probable, it can be considered, but if it raises suspicion, it should be rejected.

Evidence Law – Appreciation of Testimony – Minor contradictions in the testimony, while appreciating the evidence in criminal trial -contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be a ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses.

Section 18A – SC/ST Act, 1989 – Constitutional Validity – The Apex Court, observed that provisions of Section 438 Cr.PC shall not apply to the cases under Act. However, if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1989, the bar created by section 18 and 18A(i) shall not apply. Also, it has overruled the previous judgement of Dr.SUBHASH KASHINATH MAHAJAN Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR – (2018) 6 SCC 454.

The court discusses the distinction between section 34 and 149 of IPC. Common object does not necessarily require proof of a prior meeting of minds or pre-consort, whereas common intention suggests activity in concert and presupposes the existence of a prepared plan, implying a prior meeting of minds. However, both deal with vicarious liability of a person for the acts of others. Further, it overlaps in a way that if several persons numbering five or more do an act or intend to do it but section 34 and section 149 may apply.

The court observed that, by submitting an application under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the restoration of conjugal rights within the same roof, a spouse cannot claim that they would force another person to cohabit with them and treat them cruelly at the same time.

The court observed that, it is a common misperception that a person facing a life sentence has an unassailable right to be released after serving 14 or 20 years in jail. No such right exists for the prisoner. Subject to any remission granted by the appropriate government under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks in that section and the substantive checks in Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a convict serving a life sentence is expected to remain in custody until the end of his life.

The Court held in the Instant case that the following, among other circumstances, can generally be used to determine if someone had the intent to cause death:

The type of weapon used,
whether the accused carried the weapon or if it was picked up there,
whether the blow is intended at a crucial area of the body,
The amount of force used to inflict harm,
Whether the act occurred during a sudden argument,
Whether the incident was accidental or the result of premeditation,
Whether the deceased was a stranger or there had been any prior animosity,
Whether there was any serious or unexpected provocation, and if so, what caused it,
Whether the alleged offender delivered a single strike or multiple blows,
Whether the alleged victim of injury was unfairly treated or acted in a cruel and unusual manner.

The Court observed that, even though the circumstances may suggest that the theft and the murder may have been committed simultaneously, it is risky to assume that the person in possession of the stolen item was also responsible for the murder when there is just recovered stolen property as evidence against the accused. Additionally, it relies on the type of recovered property to determine whether it was likely to transfer easily from one person to another. Proof should be replaced with suspicion.

The court observed that, during the process of performing dacoity, if a dacoit murders a person, all the co-dacoits will also be held liable under section 396 IPC, even if they did not participate in the killing, and were only a part of the dacoity. Both 302 and 396 IPC have the same obligations for imposing a death penalty or imprisonment for life. Although the offence under Section 396 IPC is to be treated seriously, the court has more discretion when it comes to the potential for imposing a punishment other than death penalty or imprisonment for life when the criminal under Section 396 IPC is found guilty.

The court observed that, section 366 of the CrPC casts a duty upon the High Court to, (a) “examine the nature and manner in which the offence was committed, mens reas, if any of the culprit, the plight of the victim as noted by the trail court, the diabolic manner in which the offence was alleged to have been performed, the ill-effects it had on the victim as well as the society at large, the mindset of the culprit vis-à-vis the public interest, the conduct of the convict immediately after the commission of the offence and thereafter, the past history of the culprit, the magnitude of the crime and also the consequences it had on the dependants or the custodians of the victim.” “there should be very wide range of consideration to be made by the High Court dealing with reference in order to ensure that the ultimate outcome of the reference would instil confidence in the minds of the peace-loving citizens and also achieve the object as the deterrent for others from indulging in such crimes.”

The court held that, Criminal law does not recognise the terms ‘same cause of action’. A per se FIR cannot be cancelled once evidence implicating the petitioner in a conspiracy has been discovered. As soon as an accused makes an attempt to commit an offence, they are subject to punishment, and many offences of this nature can be charged simultaneously. When the facts and circumstances of the case warrant it, a person may be charged with both offences concurrently under Sections 138 of the NI Act and 420 of the IPC.

It is established that the authority granted by Section 438 of the CrPC is not to be used frequently. The authority must be used if it appears that an accusation was made with the intent to harm or humiliate the applicant by having him arrested. Consequently, bail cannot be ordered in advance of an arrest if it will be utilised as a defence. However at the present moment phase, it cannot be concluded based on the circumstances of the case that the accusations are baseless or were merely fabricated to harm or degrade the applicant by getting him detained. The court held that there is no reason to grant anticipatory bail to the applicant.

The court observed that, a complaint under section 138 of NI Act, when an FIR of offences under section 420, 560 IPC was already filed with respect to circumstances of identical nature/ same transaction does not amount to forum shopping or double jeopardy. The offence under section 420 IPC is made during the issuance of the cheque while that is not the case with the offence covered under section 138 of NI Act. Both the offences are independent and distinct from one other and do not attract the principle of double jeopardy. The court held that it is within the rights of the respondent to go ahead with the prosecution for both the offences simultaneously under section 138 of NI Act and section 420 of IPC.

The court observed that, the circumstance of ‘last seen’, along with the failure to provide a reasonable explanation of the accused are not enough to establish the guilt of the accused being reasonable doubt. As the case was relying on the last seen theory and no plausible explanation was provided by the accused, the guilt of the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt and homicidal death is in the realm of uncertainty. Thereby, the accused was not convicted under section 302 of IPC.

The Court observed that offences under the section 304-B IPC are besides being grave, heinous, offences against society driven with the demand of dowry, and needs to be prevented. It further held that, cases involving such offence cannot be quashed just because the accused and complainant have come to some sort of agreement/ settlement.

The Supreme Court observed that the intention of an accused can be ascertained by the part of the body where the accused chose to assault the victim and the nature of injury inflicted upon the victim by the accused, and that no one can enter the mind of the accused to read the intention of his. The nature of injury inflicted on a vital part of the body and the weapon all must be considered to accuse a person of an offence.

The Court observed that any criticism of the judiciary or judges that would hinder the administration of justice or put it in jeopardy must be avoided. This attempt results in the contempt of court procedures. All criticisms of the judiciary must be perfectly rational, sober, and stem from the highest motives without being tainted by any party, spirit or techniques, as required by national interest. Without a shadow of a doubt, the press has access to the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and criticising a decision harshly but honestly is a legitimate right, not a crime. Contempt is not implied by an honest and reasonable criticism of a judge’s public decision or public act related to the administration of justice. No one, much less Judges, can claim infallibility, hence it is necessary to encourage such fair and reasonable criticism. However, the criticism must not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair.

The court held that for an accused acquitted to join as a police constable, mere acquittal will not be sufficient. The court observed that being acquitted on the absence of any evidence is different from acquittal based on grounds of benefit of doubt. Thereby, in the case of an heinous offence, an acquittal based on the grounds of benefit of doubt would not make the respondent eligible for appointment as a police constable.

The court laid down certain guidelines which must be followed before a case against an accused can be fully established:

(a) circumstances from which conclusion of guilt is drawn must be established fully,

(b) there should be consistency between the facts established and the hypothesis of guilt of the accused,

(d) all possible hypothesis except the one to be proved must be eliminated,

(e) the chain of evidence must be complete as to there can be no reasonable ground for a conclusion pointing the innocence of the accused, showing that in all possibility, the accused has performed the act.

The court while ascertaining the scope of Sec 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 held that the Act does not deal with offences which are ‘heinous’ in nature. It observes that even if a child commits a heinous offence, he cannot be automatically tried as an adult. Before, trying a child as an adult, an exhaustive study must be performed and the procedure in place must be adhered to. The offences which do not attract punishment of minimum 7 years do not fall under the category of ‘heinous offence’, and rather fall under the category of ‘serious offences’.

The Jurisdiction over infringement suits in which the defendant seeks revocation of registration of design vests in High Court under S. 22(4) of the Designs Act, 2000, even when the High Court does not exercise original side jurisdiction. Operation of S. 22(4) of the 2000 Act is not affected by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The Supreme Court held that the execution proceedings and original proceedings are separate and independent. An appeal under S. 23 of the Consumer Protection Act will not lie to Supreme Court against an order which has been passed in the course of execution proceedings. An appeal under S. 23 is maintainable against an order which has been passed by NCDRG on a complaint where the value of goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed, exceeds the threshold which is prescribed. Hence the appeal under S. 23 of the CP Act against the order in execution dismissed as being non-maintainable.

The Bombay High Court observed that an arbitral tribunal cannot apply public law principles on fairness and reasonableness. The Court held that “A writ court may well hold against a public body on a public law principle or by invoking Article 14; But an Arbitrator, constrained as he or she is by the contract, has no such power”.

The Terrorist Acts defined under Unlawful Assembly Prevention Act only deal with matters impacting “Defence of India” and not under Ordinary laws & Order Problems. The intent and purport of the Parliament in enacting the UAPA, and more specifically in amending it in 2004 and 2008 to bring terrorist activity within its scope, was, and could only have had been, to deal with matters of profound impact on the ‘Defence of India, nothing more and nothing less.

The Madras High Court has held that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable to seek the quashing of proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act.

The direction to take the accused into custody is beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court. Whether an accused is liable to be arrested is based upon the decision of the Investigating Officer depending upon the material collected during the investigation which may be conducted in a particular crime. It is for the Investigation Agency to whom the investigation has been entrusted to take a call as to when the petitioner is to be arrested.

The Supreme Court has held that there cannot be a recovery of cess solely on the basis of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) without any statutory adjudication process. It is well settled that when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it is to be done in that manner alone. The Court also held that the mere existence of an alternate remedy in the form of arbitration was not a bar to exercise writ jurisdiction as the impugned acts were patently illegal.

The classification of Marathas as a socially and educationally backward class was unreasonable as they belonged to a politically dominant caste with significant economic resources. The court also concluded that the majority opinion in the Indra Sawhney case was correct and that the limit of 50 percent for caste-based reservations did not need consideration by a larger bench.

The Supreme Court held that two companies incorporated in India could choose a seat for arbitration outside India and the resultant award would be enforceable under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court, however, held that such parties are also entitled to interim relief under section 9 of the Act which is similar to Article 9 of the UNICTRAL Model Law.

The Entire Waiver of Pre-deposit impermissible to file appeal before DRAT. Discretion of DRAT to reduce pre-deposit amount from 50% of debt due, held, is limited to reducing the pre-deposit to 25% thereof. The pre-deposit cannot under any circumstances be reduced below 25% of the debt due.

The presence of an arbitration clause does oust the jurisdiction under Article 226 in all cases though, it still needs to be decided from case to case as to whether recourse to a public law remedy can justifiably be invoked.

In the case of protest against Farm Laws, due to failure of negotiation between Government and farmers and no solution in sight, The Supreme Court passed an extraordinary order of stay of implementation of the Farm Laws directed and Expert Committee set up by Court to resolve the conflict between the farmers and the Government.

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